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SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

27 February 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR  
Colonel B. B. Talley, G-2  
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI  
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN  
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG

SUBJECT : SE-23: Prospects for the Establishment of  
an Inclusive Middle East Command Organization

1. The attached terms of reference have been coordinated with the NSC Staff and represent the NSC requirement for subject estimate.

2. Since the entire requirement falls entirely, if not exclusively, within the domain of the Department of State, and because of the relative urgency of the project (IAC to meet on 13 March), we propose not to meet on these terms of reference unless OIR wants a meeting.

3. OIR is requested to prepare the entire contribution and submit text to C/NE by 4 March. All other agencies are requested to contribute any material considered appropriate by that same date.

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Executive Secretary

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

27 February 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SE-23: PROSPECTS FOR THE ESTABLISH-  
MENT OF AN INCLUSIVE MIDDLE  
EAST COMMAND ORGANIZATION\*

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the major factors affecting the formation of an inclusive MEC and to estimate the prospects for the establishment of such an organization during 1952.

SCOPE

The paper will fall into three broad divisions designed to:  
(a) summarize briefly the development of the MEC concept; (b) analyze the major factors affecting the formation of an inclusive MEC; and (c), in the light of the discussion in (a) and (b), estimate the prospects for the establishment of such an organization during 1952.

\* While the Western Powers and Turkey may themselves establish an MEC, "an inclusive Middle East Command organization" is herein defined as one which obtains the active cooperation of most of the Middle Eastern countries.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEC CONCEPT

A. What is the MEC concept?

1. What were the main provisions of the 4-power communication to Egypt of 13 October 1951?
2. What were the main provisions of the 10 November statement of principles sent to the other Arab states and Israel?

B. What are the objectives of the sponsors of the MEC concept?

To what extent do their views on the MEC differ?

C. What have been the official reactions to the MEC of:

1. Egypt?
2. The other Arab states?
3. Israel?

II. WHAT MAJOR FACTORS, BOTH FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE, MAY AFFECT THE FORMATION OF AN INCLUSIVE MEC ORGANIZATION?

A. To what extent does sentiment in the area with respect to the British affect the formation of the MEC? (While the Anglo-Egyptian dispute is the most obvious manifestation of sentiment in the area, the questions which follow should be considered for other parts of the area as well.)

1. To what extent do the following aspects of the UK's

position in the Middle East affect MEC developments:

- a. British treaty rights, occupation policies, arms assistance policies?
  - b. British economic and financial relations with the ME states?
  - c. Political influence exerted through British individuals in key positions?
  - d. Territorial disputes?
  - e. Historical and psychological factors?
2. Which of these factors are of particular importance in contributing to MEC developments? In what countries?
  3. Which of these factors are of particular importance in obstructing MEC developments? In what countries?
  4. What specific developments in UK-Arab relations would significantly improve prospects of the MEC?
- B. To what extent does sentiment in the area with respect to the US affect the formation of the MEC? With respect to France? With respect to the USSR? (To be developed as in II A, insofar as the questions are applicable.)
- C. What is the effect of Arab-Israeli tension on MEC developments?
1. How important are the following considerations:

- a. Arab conviction that the US is supporting Israel at the Arabs' expense?
  - b. Arab fear that the MEC is a Western attempt to force the Arabs to modify their attitude toward Israel?
  - c. Arab hope that through the MEC the strength of Arab forces vis-a-vis Israel will increase?
  - d. Israeli fear that Arab military forces will be built up?
2. What are the prospects for a reduction (or increase) of Arab-Israeli tensions?
- a. As a result of developments in the area?
  - b. As a result of US action? British action? French action?
- D. What other major factors are affecting MEC developments?
- 1. To what extent do the Arab countries fear that the MEC is designed to strengthen Western influence in the ME?
    - a. Are they disturbed by the possibility of the Western powers acting as a coordinated bloc in dealings with the Middle East countries?
    - b. Are they disturbed by the possibility of the Western powers adopting policies designed to re-establish spheres of influence in the Middle East?

2. To what extent does neutralism inhibit MEC developments?
  - a. To what extent is this neutralism the result of anti-Western feeling? Might it be expected to remain strong even if relations between the Western powers and the Middle East countries improved significantly?
  - b. To what extent is this neutralism caused by a conviction in the Middle East that the West is incapable of defending the area against Soviet aggression?
3. To what extent does the desire of the Middle East countries for Western military and economic assistance affect their attitude toward the MEC?
4. How do the Middle East countries view the participation in the MEC of:
  - a. Turkey?
  - b. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa?
5. To what extent do rivalries among the Arab states affect their attitude toward the MEC?

III. IN VIEW OF THE FACTORS IN I AND II WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INCLUSIVE MEC ORGANIZATION DURING 1952?

- A. Is a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian controversy

essential to the establishment of an inclusive MEC?

What major issues stand in the way of a settlement? What aspects of the MEC concept are likely to be resisted by the Egyptians in the negotiations for a settlement?

- B. What would be the effect on the negotiations of a US offer to station token forces in Egypt (or anywhere else in the ME?)
- C. How could the MEC organization be expected to develop in the event of a solution of the UK-Egyptian controversy?
  - 1. What would be the attitude of the other Arab states toward the MEC?
  - 2. How would Israel react?
  - 3. What further difficulties could be expected?
- D. How could the MEC organization be expected to develop in the event of a failure of the UK and Egypt to reach a settlement of the defense and Sudan issues?
  - 1. What would be the attitude of the other Arab states toward the MEC?
  - 2. How would Israel react?
  - 3. What further difficulties could be expected?
- E. What is the likelihood of the future participation in the MEC of other Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran and Pakistan?